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A bstract
This paper analyses the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rates un­
der conditions found in some OECD and newly industrialised countries. In an 
Obstfeld (1994) framework extended to incorporate rent-seeking (government ex­
propriation) reneging on a fixed exchange rate promise unambiguously produces 
short term benefits, but long term losses. This leads to a non-straightforward 
trade-off between greediness (propensity for expropriation) and a low time pref­
erence (for instance, fostered by political stability). In particular, similarly stable 
countries may choose different exchange rate regimes due to different levels of 
rent-seeking, for instance Mexico and Chile in the 1980s.
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1 Introduction
In a growing literature on the institutional determinants of exchange rate regimes, there 
seems to be a consensus on an empirical result by Edwards (1996) that “more unstable 
countries have a lower probability of selecting a pegged-exchange-rate system.” A more re­
cent study by Alesina and Wagner (2006) is more controversial because it considers political 
instability to be one of several indicators of institutional quality and find that “typically 
... better institutions are associated with more pegged [exchange rate] regimes” .1 How­
ever, Alesina and Wagner’s paper cannot explain what happens when bad governance or 
corruption (or, indeed, state capture) do not go together with political instability. Take a 
country like Indonesia which maintained fixed exchange rates for 20 years until 1997. It is 
haunted by corruption and defective governance, which according to Alesina and Wagner 
would point towards floating exchange rates. Yet there was a high level of political stability 
with Suharto in power for 32 years which would suggest fixed exchange rates. Take another 
example. Mexico and Chile were both very stable countries in the 1980s (though one even 
less democratic than the other). Nonetheless, Chile was committed to fixed exchange rates 
whereas Mexico allowed the exchange rate to float. One difference between the two countries 
was that Chile had less corruption and better governance.
This paper is motivated by these observations. It captures the government’s optimal choice 
between flexible and fixed exchange rates while acknowledging that political instability and 
institutional quality may affect this choice in different ways. Models by Obstfeld (1994) and 
Anderson (1998) are extended to allow for expropriation by the government while taking 
into account that political instability increases the government’s impatience (i.e. time­
preference). On the one hand, we study the effect of expropriation on the choice of the
1 More precisely, Alesina and W agner’s (2006) results suggest a “U-shaped relationship” according to 
which “countries th a t float tend to  be either very low ... or very high in the institutional quality scale” . 
Hossain (2009) argues th a t the relevance of institutions for the choice of the exchange rate regime depends 
on the level of financial development. O ther reasons for the choice of the exchange rate regime are surveyed 
by Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005); for the choice of anchor currencies by Meissner and Oomes (2009).
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exchange rate regime.2 Similar to Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996), the government 
has both control over fiscal and monetary policy. We do not model a conflict between 
independent monetary and fiscal authorities (nor do we model elections) as, for instance, in 
Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi’s (2004) extended Barro-Gordon (1983) model.3 On 
the other hand, political instability -  modelled as an argument of the discount factor as 
suggested by Edwards (1996) -  has the same effect as in Meon and Rizzo (2002). They 
show that governments tend to renege on fixed exchange rate promises when the country 
becomes more unstable.
Assuming a fixed exchange rate regime as a starting point, this paper captures the govern­
ment’s optimal choice between reneging on or complying with the fixed regime.4 The govern­
ment has social objectives aiming at low inflation and high output to satisfy the electorate. 
But it also expropriates wealth from society by using fees or taxes which have a negative 
impact on output. More specifically, the additional fiscal burden could be interpreted as 
distortionary income tax. Reneging on a fixed exchange rate promise unambiguously pro­
duces short term benefits, because the government can achieve lower real wages and boost 
output by deceitfully increasing inflation above agents’ expectations. However, there are 
long term losses since cheating only works once and inflation including its negative effects 
persist. It can be shown that reneging on a fixed exchange rate regime is advantageous 
to the government only if it is sufficiently greedy (i.e. determined to exploit the country) 
and/or sufficiently impatient (including its fear of losing power). The main result of this 
paper is that the choice of exchange rate regime depends of the combined effect of greediness 
and time preference, though not straightforwardly. In particular, similarly stable countries
2 A reverse problem is analysed by Hefeker (2010). He finds th a t pegging to  a low-inflation currency can 
improve institutional quality.
3 In empirical papers, Schuknecht (1999) discusses the reverse causality, i.e. the effect of exchange rate 
regimes on fiscal policy, Alesina and Summers (1993) study the im pact of central bank independence on 
economic performance, and Bergvall (2005) simulates ou tput and ou tput volatility for alternative exchange 
rate regimes in Sweden.
4 Edwards (2000) argues th a t ’’countries should opt either for floating or for super-fixity (currency boards 
or dollarization).” In contrast, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argue th a t interm ediate exchange rate regimes 
do m atter.
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may choose different exchange rate regimes due to different levels of rent-seeking. For in­
stance, Chile was considered to have good governance and little corruption in the 1980s. It 
chose fixed exchange rates. By contrast, 1980s Mexico with a much worse governance record 
preferred flexible exchange rates.
Obviously, the model is not applicable to all countries and has a number of limitations. 
First, the surprise inflation argument is only appropriate for countries where wage bargain­
ing is working properly. Only when trade unions are sufficiently free can we assume that 
workers can secure steady real wages (unless there is a surprise). The list of countries with 
sufficient labour standards includes, among others, most OECD and many Latin American 
countries (Aidt and Tsannatos, 2002). Second, the central bank is assumed to be more or 
less dependent on the government. So most of today’s OECD countries would be excluded. 
But in the past central bank independence was not obvious, even in OECD countries. So 
Italy and France in the 70s and 80s would be suitable examples for our model. Third, elec­
tions are not considered explicitly and there is no feedback effect of economic performance 
on political stability. Forth, and probably most problematic, we totally ignore the effect of 
exchange rates on trade (and aggregate demand). All of these limitations offer ample scope 
for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the extended Obstfeld 
(1994) framework. Section 3 discusses the time line and the reneging and complying scenar­
ios. Section 4 determines the overall gain and interprets the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 P olitical Econom y M odel
The model extends the Obstfeld (1994) model in two ways: (i) the government can raise 
an expropriation tax which negatively affects output; and (ii) government behaviour is 
determined by an expropriation revenue objective in addition to the standard inflation and 
output objectives.
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Output is determined by a modified short run expectations-augmented aggregate supply 
curve:
yt =  y +  0 (nt -  wt) -  t. (1)
Output yt deviates from hypothetical trend output y for two reasons: (i) wage inflation Wt 
can differ from price inflation nt ; and (ii) there is a burden from expropriation tax rate 7 1 
(which could also be interpreted as distortionary income taxes) .5 Hence equation (1) could 
also be called short run aggregate supply curve cum deadweight loss effect of taxes. Wages 
are assumed to be based on expected price inflation:
wt =  ne. (2)
Purchasing power parity links the home country to the rest of the world (foreign country f):
êt =  nt -  n l , (3)
where the rate of depreciation êt depends on the inflation differential. Analogously for the 
expected rate of depreciation:
êe =  ne -  ( n i)e, (4)
Assuming the home country to be small the foreign inflation rate n l  is given and normalised
at 0 %:
n l =  =  0. (5)
5 It is im portant to  realise th a t hypothetical trend ou tput y  is not attainable as long as the government 
raises expropriation taxes a t least to  some degree. Confer equation (7).
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After insertions the supply function looks as follows:
yt =  y +  0(et -  e^) -  ^ 7 1. (6)
The monetary component in the supply function now captures any deviation of exchange 
rates from expected exchange rates. A depreciation is not harmful for output as long 
as it is expected. In any credible fixed exchange rate regime (including a crawling peg), 
expectations would always correspond to actual depreciation rates -  and there would be no 
effect on output.
The government’s linear quadratic loss function is assumed to comprise the standard com­
ponents, deviation from desired inflation and deviation from hypothetical trend output, but 
also an expropriation component:
l  =  2<a)2 + »1(y -  y«)2 + «  2<R* -  Y.yt)- (7 )
The government cares for inflation, for instance because inflation produces a deadweight 
loss and public discontent. The loss increases over-proportionately with increasing inflation. 
The government is also concerned about output, for instance because a reduction in output 
causes unemployment which again results in public discontent. The problem increases over- 
proportionately with more and more unemployment. Theoretically, this formulation implies 
a loss, if yt exceeds y. However, due to the distortionary effect of taxes on output in 
equation (1), yt will always be below y.6 The inflation objective (weight 1) and the output 
objective (exogenous weight 0) capture the standard social/economic objectives, here the 
government’s interest in the economy as a whole. These social objectives could be interpreted 
in terms of the government’s investment in securing reelection (thought there is no explicit 
feedback from the economic conditions to the government’s chances of staying in power).
6 To avoid complications, ky with k > 1 could be used. B ut th a t is not instrum ental for the findings in 
this paper.
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The additional third term in the loss function reflects the government’s intention to exploit 
society. The exogenous weight 8 the government puts on expropriation will be called greed. 
The government is assumed to desire some level of expropriation revenue R*. The difference 
to the actual expropriation revenue Ytyt enters as a loss. The expropriation objective was 
chosen in linear format. A quadratic form would only drive the actual expropriation revenue 
closer to the desired level, but would not change anything fundamentally. There would be 
two problems though. The first issue is conceptual in nature. There is no clear-cut level for 
R* which should be reached with urgency. It does not make sense to punish deviations more 
and more with growing distance to this arbitrary level of R*. In fact, the linear formulation 
allows for a gain when the actual expropriation exceeds the target level R*. Thus R* could be 
set to 0 and effectively deleted from the equation, but is left in the equation for expositional 
reasons. Secondly, there is a technical issue. A quadratic form would complicate the analysis 
unnecessarily.
We obtain a consolidated loss function by inserting twice the constraint, i.e. supply function 
(6), into equation (7):
Lt =  2 (êt)2 +  62 (- ^ t  -  ee) +  ^Yt)2 +  82 (R* -  Yt(y +  0(êt -  êe) -  ^7 t)). (8)
The equation contains the exogenous parameters 6, 8, 0 and ^  and the constant variables 
y and R*. For minimising its loss, the government has one or two policy instruments 
depending on the situation (scenario). Expropriation taxes Yt are always determined by the 
government, but the rate of depreciation, et , may be fixed or used as another instrument. 
The formation of expectations of the rate of depreciation, êe, will be discussed in the next 
section. Altogether, the equation has eight components (loss items):
1. Inflation loss: Any depreciation relative to the stable foreign currency means a devi­
ation from monetary stability, i.e. inflation, and carries a loss for society. Obviously, 
a government may choose to attribute only a small relative weight for inflation (by 
making the other weights 6 and 8 larger).
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2. Inflation expectation induced output “gain”: A surprise depreciation, i.e. a switch 
to flexible exchange rates while private agents still believe in the fixed rate, means 
decreasing real wages and, therefore, lower production costs and increasing output. 
Nonetheless, squaring ( - 0(êt -  êe)) produces a positive term, i.e. a loss. Only the 
cross factor component (next item) is negative. Items 2 and 3 appear together and 
are only present, when there is a surprise depreciation.
3. Cross factor component: Combining 2 and 4 due to the squaring, this is negative, i.e. 
a gain.
4. Expropriation tax induced output loss: There is always an expropriation tax and its 
deadweight loss effect reduces output, thereby producing a loss for the government -  
assuming it values society’s output at least to some degree.
5. Desired revenue loss: The loss increases with the magnitude of the expropriation 
revenue desired by the government (target level R*). It is, however, reduced or offset 
by the actual expropriation revenue (determined by items 6 to 8 together).
6. Trend output induced revenue gain (offsetting loss 5): Higher hypothetical trend out­
put represents a gain as it reduces the gap to the desired expropriation revenue.
7. Inflation expectation induced revenue gain (offsetting loss 5): A surprise depreciation 
has a positive effect on output and therefore on the expropriation revenue. Thus a 
gain.
8. Expropriation tax induced revenue loss: The last term ^Yt signifies that the expropria­
tion tax has a negative impact on output, thereby reducing the expropriation revenue, 
hence reducing the positive effect of items 6 and 7. In other words, it represents a 
loss.
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3 Tim e Line and Two Scenarios
In the following, we assume that the government in question has made a commitment to 
keep exchange rates fixed. The country holds enough foreign reserves to make this a credible 
commitment. In fact, we assume that the public trusts the government and does not know 
that there might be reasons for the government to renege on its promise. By contrast, 
the government acts rationally on the basis of loss function (8). To determine whether to 
comply with or renege on its promise the government compares the losses in both cases 
(scenarios) and calculates its net loss for each period.7 Introducing a discount factor we can 
then consolidate the net losses of all periods and determine the overall gain from reneging 
(which may be positive or negative).
If the country commits to fixed exchange rates in period T monetary policies are necessarily 
stability-oriented. Expansionary monetary policies are not possible as they would only result 
in pressure on the exchange rate which would require foreign exchange market interventions, 
thus offsetting the expansionary policies. In a stylised setting with zero inflation abroad, this 
means there will be no inflation at home either. Therefore, private agents will not demand 
wage rises. Once wage bargaining is complete, however, the government can decide, if it 
will go along with its promise or renege on it. If it reneges, there will be short-term effects 
(compared to complying), because real wage costs decrease and output expands. Raising 
output above its optimal level will prompt the government to make adjustments in its 
optimal choice of policy, in particular it will be able to increase the expropriation tax in 
period T, yt , which, in turn, has a negative impact on output.
The model is set up such that there are no intertemporal linkages. This is a caveat, although 
it has been done in the literature before. The policy game played in period T is separate from 
the policy game in period T+1, etc. However, the government’s decision to renege affects
7 Another in terpretation is possible. Assume th a t the public wants to  verify, whether they can tru st the 
government or not. If private agents determ ine th a t upholding its promise is not the governm ent’s best 
choice, then the public would stop believing in the fixed exchange rate regime and it would collapse even 
before the government can take the decision to  renege on its promise.
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agents’ depreciation expectations for the future. The time line of events looks as follows. 
In period T, there is wage bargaining first, then the government’s decision to comply (thus 
defining the complying scenario) or renege (reneging scenario). The outcome of the wage 
bargaining in T+1 and all following periods is determined by the government’s period T 
decision. So is the government’s decision in period T+1 and thereafter.
For simplicity, we assume that the government has only got one chance of reneging in period 
T. If it does, it is stuck with a flexible exchange rate in the future. The government can 
no longer exploit private agents’ trust. From T+1 onwards, agents correctly expect the 
inflationary policies of the government and demand wage increases accordingly. Going back 
to fixed exchange rates is not possible, because the presence of inflationary wages means that 
the government’s stability-oriented policies would only cause real wage increases and output 
losses. Thus it is optimal for the government to stick to the high inflation (depreciation) 
scenario. We also assume that complying in period T means complying in all future periods. 
The argument is that, if it were optimal for the government to comply in period T, there 
would be no reason why it should not be optimal in T+1 or thereafter.
Consider what happens in the complying scenario. There are no demands for wage increases 
and the government sticks to monetary commitment throughout. In period T as well as 
in periods T+1, T+2, ... it optimises with respect to the expropriation tax only. The 
government’s expropriation revenue will be smaller than desired because taxes also have 
a negative impact on output, thus trading off the negative output effect for the positive 
expropriation revenue effect. The loss in each period (confer appendix A) consists of the 
expropriation tax induced output loss (aforementioned loss item 4), the desired revenue loss 
(item 5), the trend output gain (item 6), and the expropriation tax induced revenue loss 
(item 8).
Next, let us look at the reneging scenario. The government reneges on its monetary com­
mitment in period T which leads to a permanent switch to flexible exchange rates. In period 
T agents had not asked for a wage increase because they still believed in the government’s
10
promise. Once wage bargaining is complete, the government reoptimises with respect to 
taxes and inflation. It can boost output by increasing inflation above the expected level. 
While doing so, it is optimal to increase expropriation taxation which damages output. 
Overall, there is an increase in output in period T. In period T+1 agents do not trust the 
government and will demand wage increases in accordance with the government’s optimal ex 
post decision irrespective of its intensions. Therefore, it will be optimal for the government 
to optimise and validate private agents’ expectations. Inflation will be higher now, but there 
will be no beneficial effect on output. Hence expropriation taxes will be set optimally at 
the same level as in the complying scenario.
The loss in the reneging scenario is different in T compared to the subsequent periods 
(confer appendices B and C). In period T, there is -  compared to the complying scenario 
-  an additional inflation loss (aforementioned loss item 1), but at least partly offset by 
inflation expectation induced gains both in terms of output (items 2 and 3) and revenue 
(item 7). At higher levels of taxation there will also be higher expropriation tax induced 
losses both in terms of output (item 4) and revenue (item 8). In period T+1 and all other 
future periods, taxes are back to ’’normal” (complying scenario level) even though inflation 
has increased (with inflation correctly being anticipated). Therefore, inflation expectation 
induced gains and additional expropriation tax induced losses will be gone -  compared to 
period T.
4 Greed, T im e Preference and Overall Gain
We can now compare the two scenarios quantitatively in each period. Concerning any fu­
ture period (T+1, T+2, etc.) the loss in the complying scenario is smaller than the loss 
in the reneging scenario. In other words, it would be advantageous to keep the monetary 
commitment. In each future period, permanently switching to flexible exchange rates pro­
duces a higher loss because of the additional negative inflation loss (item 1). There are no
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offsetting positive effects. The situation is very different when comparing the complying and 
the reneging scenarios in period T. Effects are countervailing. The reneging scenario again 
bears the additional negative inflation loss (item 1). However, there are further additional 
positive and negative induced output effects (items 2, 3 and 4) and induced revenue effects 
(items 7 and 8). Nonetheless, the comparison for period T is unambiguous as well. Reneging 
on the monetary commitment is advantageous in period T because the gain from increases 
in terms of output and expropriation revenue dominate the additional inflation loss.
So far, we know that reneging produces a net gain in period T and a net loss in all future 
periods -  compared to the complying scenario. To determine which scenario is more ad­
vantageous overall for a government (and hence chosen by it) we must make assumptions 
about how the government discounts its future. It is straightforward to assume a constant 
time preference rate. However, the effective discount factor p (0 < p < 1) will also be 
influenced by the government’s chances to stay in power. This may depend on more or less 
rigged elections (like in Egypt) or on the chances for a revolution or a coup d ’etat (like 
in most Latin American countries in the 1970s or 80s). In any case, modeling the chance 
to stay in power as a response to the government’s behaviour is difficult and somewhat 
arbitrary. Even in democracies election outcomes are often strongly influenced by random 
events like foreign policy incidents, terror attacks (e.g. Madrid bombings in Spain in 2004) 
or natural disasters (e.g. river Oder flooding in Germany in 2002). A simpler alternative is 
to assume a constant (or variable) exogenous chance of losing power in each period. Even 
more simplistically, one could model the chance of losing power just once. No m atter how 
this is modelled, incorporating political instability into the analysis has only one effect: the 
effective discount factor p is reduced.8 Following Edwards (1996) we assume, therefore, that 
the effective discount factor is a function of political instability. So, effective discount factor
8 This is straightforward, because the (non-discounted) net loss of reneging relative to  complying is 
identical for all future periods. -  This is confirmed by Meon and Rizzo (2002) who discuss explicitly the 
effects of political instability on a governm ent’s choice of the exchange rate regime. B ut it also applies in 
other contexts, for instance, in the government finance decision under political instability discussed in Bohn 
(2006).
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p captures both normal time preference as well as political instability. Henceforth, the terms 
effective discount factor, impatience and political instability will be used interchangeably.
The overall gain GO from a permanent switch to flexible exchange rates, i.e. the net gain in 
T minus the discounted net losses in all future periods (T+1, T+2, etc.), turns out to be:
go =  A[(1 -  2p)B +  pC] (9)
G =  B 2[B -  C](1 -  p) (9)
with
A =  1(1  ¿ y ) ¥ 2( #  +  2 i ) 2 > 0,
B =  ^ ( ^  +  £) > 0,
C =  02(1)2i 2 > 0.
B — C > 0 according to appendix B.
The exogenous parameters 0, £, 0 and ^  as well as exogenous discount factor p determine, 
if the overall gain of switching is positive or negative. Hypothetical trend y only matters for 
the magnitude of the overall gain or loss. Unsurprisingly, arbitrary expropriation objective 
R* does not matter at all. If the overall gain is positive the government chooses to switch 
to flexible exchange rates in period T and sticks with flexible rates thereafter. If there 
is a negative gain, the government chooses to uphold its fixed exchange rate commitment 
indefinitely.
Since 0 < p < 1 the denominator must be positive. The numerator is positive for p < 2, 
but may or may not be positive otherwise:
1 C
C ° > 0 ^  p < 2 + 2(2B -  C ) (10)
C 1with 0 > —-------- — < -  since B > C.“  2(2B -  C) 2
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For given exogenous parameters 0, 0 and ^ , equation (10) establishes a relationship between 
p, 8 and GO which is sketched in figure 1. As the government becomes more and more greedy, 
i.e. 8 goes up, it is expropriating the economy more and more by increasing expropriation 
tax Yt , thereby choking back output. The sufficient condition for the minimisation problem 
in period T of the reneging scenario requires that B > C. Confer appendix B. The limiting 
case B =  C defines a quadratic equation in 8 which has only one positive root, 8max. We 
can show that 8 must be smaller than 8max. The overall gain GO goes to infinity for 8 
approaching 8max, but decreases for smaller values of 8. Realistically, we cannot be close to 
8max, however, because there would be a lasting effect on output capacity and hence output 
in the following periods. This is not envisaged in this model since we treat all periods 
independently. We would also assume that the effective discount factor is below, say, .95, 
even if there is no political instability at all (due to normal time preference considerations).
Figure 1: G reed and Im patience
P
ò
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Figure 1 shows the region of positive overall gain in a p -  8 diagram. As long as p < 2 
(extreme discounting), the overall gain will always be positive. This means that a fixed 
exchange rate regime can never be an option for a rational government in a very unstable 
environment. For p > 2, the overall gain will turn negative at some stage for decreasing 
values of 8. A smooth and slightly concave curve connecting the points (2,0) and (1,8max) 
defines the border between positive (above) and negative overall gains (below). This implies 
that even a very greedy government would want to stick to fixed exchange rates, as long 
as there is very little political instability. It would also be rational to keep fixed exchange 
rates, if greed is low, even though there is quite a lot of political instability (but p > 2). 
Between those two extremes, political stability can be traded off for greed.
5 Conclusion
In an extended Obstfeld (1994) model we have investigated a government’s rational choice 
of the exchange rate regime. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of greed favour reneging on the 
fixed exchange rate promise, because the increase in expropriation taxes made possible by 
a surprise inflation is valued more. However, the results suggest that it can be rational for 
the government to stick to fixed exchange rates despite high levels of greed, if there is a lot 
of political stability (little impatience). Conversely, low levels of political instability (i.e. 
little impatience) tempt a government to forego the short run benefit in favour of the long 
run advantage of low inflation. In other words, the government would want to comply with 
the fixed exchange rate regime as, for instance, in the case of Chile in the 1980s. However, 
it can be rational for a government to renege despite high levels of political stability, if the 
government is very greedy. This would be the case, for instance, of Mexico during the same 
time period.
Despite numerous empirical studies, it may still be useful to explain the determinants of 
exchange rate regimes in theoretical papers. This can help us understand the underlying
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mechanisms and explain real world observations which might be washed out in econometric 
studies. At the same time, empirical papers based on institutional variables are still facing 
some serious problems. For instance, there are unresolved endogeneity issues, there are 
problems based on the fact that some variables are only available as time-invariant data, 
and often data sets are not sufficiently large. For all these reasons, it would be worth while 
exploring the impact of other institutional variables in theoretical models.
Furthermore, all limitations mentioned in the introduction offer ample scope for future 
research. In a similar model framework, one could analyse the impact of exchange rate 
regimes on alternative labour market structures (for instance, falling real wages when there 
are devaluations). Dual labour markets similar to the Harris-Todaro (1970) model could be 
analysed. Also, the implications of elections or feedback effects of economic performance on 
political stability could be studied. A different model framework would be needed to include 
central bank independence or to analyse the effect of devaluations on trade. In any case, 
there is still a lot of scope for studying the impact of institutions on the choice of exchange 
rate regimes.
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A ppendix
A C om plying Scenario
The government’s minimisation problem is identical in all periods:
max Lt s.t. nt =  0 t =  T, T + 1 ,T  +  2,
i t
max 01 ^ 27t2 +  81 ( R  -  Yty +  ^7 t2) t =  T ,T  +  1,T +  2 ,.... (A.1)
The loss in each period is:
1 (18y)2
L  = 8 2 R*-  t =  T ' T  + ' - T  + 2- ~  <A‘2)
B Sufficient C ondition for R eneging Scenario, Period  T
To ensure that our problem is a well-defined minimisation problem, we have to check the 
semi-definiteness condition:
LYTy t nj > (LnyYt )
^  V W  +  8) > 0 2(1)282 (B.1)
This condition will be imposed. It implies that the denominator in equation (C.2) is positive.
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C R eneging Scenario
The government’s minimisation problem in period T is:
maxYT l t  s.t. ne =  0
max 2(eT)2 +  0^ - « ^ r  +  ^Yt )2 +  82(R* -  Yt (y +  0èT -  ^Yt )) (C.l)
The loss in period T is:
1 ( 2 8y)2(1 +  # 2)Lt =  8-R* -* 2 2^ B -  C (C.2)
with
B =  ^ ( ^  +  8) > 0,
C =  02(1)282 > 0.
B -  C > 0 according to appendix B.
The government’s minimisation problem in the following periods is:
max Lt s.t. nf =  ntYt,nt 1 t =  T +  1,T +  2,
max 1(et)2 
+ 01 ( - 0 (ét -  èj) +  ^Yt)2
+ 8 2 ( r * -  Yt (y +  ^ (e*-  èe) -  ^Yt)) t =  T +  1, T +  2,.... (C.3)
The loss in each period is:
L =  8 1 R* _  2( 18y)2( W  +  8) -  02W  +  28)) 
* 2 >^2(0^ +  8)2 t =  T ,T  +  1, T +  2,..(.C.4)
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